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1. Background on Methods 
 
Over the past 25 years significant structural changes have occurred in the United States that have 
influenced poverty, making current-day poverty different in some ways from poverty just a few 
decades ago. These structural changes include transformations in our economic structure such as 
the shift from manufacturing employment to service-sector employment; the de-
institutionalization of people with mental illnesses into community settings; welfare reform, 
which resulted in a an emphasis on work over welfare; changes in immigration patterns; and 
skyrocketing rates of incarceration. Given these considerable changes, the vast majority of the 
literature referenced in this summary is from the mid-1990s through 2007 to capture what has 
been learned about poverty within this new context. Studies prior to this time period are 
referenced when they are the most recent available and/or are landmark studies that are still 
applicable to the issue being addressed. 
 
The majority of the literature referenced here on each specific poverty-related issue is primary 
research that used rigorous econometric or statistical methods and robust nationally 
representative data sets. Included are studies and findings that surface throughout high quality 
literature reviews on the specified issues. Most have been published in journals or at poverty 
institutes affiliated with universities. The assessment of the methods of analysis used in the 
referenced research was rooted in peer reviews, frequency of citations, and perceived quality; for 
the purposes of this summary the methods were not re-analyzed or tested. Though there is a large 
body of international research on issues related to poverty, the research addressed here is almost 
exclusively focused on findings within the context of the United States.  
 
What follows is an analysis of these characteristic causes of poverty as well as research on issues 
that impact income, earnings, and poverty, some of which can be considered proximate 
determinants of poverty. These issues include characteristics and life experiences that put people 
at risk of not working or not working enough to prevent entry into poverty, such as race and 
gender of head of household, strength of the economy, quality of wages, human capital 
(education) of working age adults, health or disability status of household members, having a 
criminal record, being an immigrant, having experienced domestic violence, and neighborhood 
conditions. Certain events are more influential for various subgroups within the at-risk-of-
poverty population than they are for others. 
 
This summary does not include an analysis of the public benefits determinants of poverty, and as 
such, discussions of benefit levels and impacts for unearned income sources such as disability 
income and welfare are not included.∗ 
 
                                                 
∗ Throughout this paper we typically apply terminology as used by the researcher being cited. This is most prevalent 
in the use racial and ethnic terms, such as black versus African American, or Hispanic versus Latino.  
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2. Poverty Overview: Scale and Dynamics in the United 
States 
 
The scale and conditions of poverty make it one of the most pressing social issues facing the 
nation. Over 36 million people in the United States are living in poverty and 54 million are 
at severe risk of falling into poverty.1 The annual rate of entry into poverty for the total 
population of the United States has been estimated at roughly three percent per year.2  
 
Poverty will touch 
the majority of 
Americans at some 
point during 
adulthood. It is 
estimated that, on 
average, 60 percent 
of 20 year olds in 
America will 
experience poverty 
at some point during 
their adult years and 
about half of adults 
will experience 
poverty by the time 
they are age 65. As 
shown in the 
Cumulative Lifetime 
Risk of Poverty, by 
Race graphic, 27.1 percent of adults will experience poverty by the age of 30, 41.8 percent by the 
age of 50, and 51.4 percent by age 65.3 In addition, one third of the overall population of the 
United States will experience extreme poverty in their lifetimes, with incomes below half of the 
poverty line.4 
 
Poverty is not a fixed state. Rather, the state of poverty is fluid with families moving into and out 
of poverty at different points in time. Almost half of the spells of poverty are quite short: nearly 
45 percent end within 1 year, 70 percent are over within 3 years, and 12 percent last 10 years or 
more.5 In general, research suggests that the longer a person has been poor, the less likely it is 
that he or she will escape poverty.6 Further complicating matters, though many spells of 
poverty are short, there is substantial risk of returning to poverty after having exited. Poverty 
reentry rates are relatively high: half of all individuals ending a poverty spell in a given year 
will again have incomes below the poverty line within 4 years.7 
 
There are considerable disparities in the rates of poverty entry across racial groups. While overall 
the majority of people who are poor are white, individuals who are black are much more likely to 
experience poverty than those who are white. Race is foremost among the distinguishing 
characteristics with respect to a child’s probability of experiencing poverty.8 Virtually every 
Graphic from Rank and Hirschl, 1999, p211 
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black American will experience poverty at some point during his or her adulthood: 9 out of 
every 10 black and 1 out of every 2 white American adults (age 20 and up) who live out a 
normal lifespan (defined as to age 75) will at some point experience poverty.9 Similar 
disparities exist in the likelihood of reentering poverty after having escaped it: more than half of 
all people who are black and around one third of people who are white that fall into poverty in 
some year will have family incomes below the poverty line in 5 or more of the next 10 years, 
with the average time in poverty over the next 10 years at over 4 years. Among people who are 
black, the probability of returning to poverty after 1 year out is more than a third.10   
 
In looking at poverty across all ages, the poverty rate for children remains higher than for any 
other age group and for elderly who become poor, poverty is more persistent. Nearly half of the 
children in the United States will become economically vulnerable at least once during their 
childhood; and about one third will actually fall below the poverty line.11 Long-term child 
poverty is unequally distributed: almost 9 out of 10 long-term poor children are African 
American.12 In addition, it can be long lasting: poor children are many times more likely than 
non-poor children to be poor in their mid-twenties (24.1% versus 3.8%).13 While Social Security 
has had a tremendous impact on reducing poverty rates for seniors, along with the fact that 
people who are older are less likely to enter poverty14, poverty still persists for almost 3.4 million 
people age 65 and older.15 Households headed by an older adult (age 55 and over) are less likely 
to exit poverty than other age groups.16 
 
Finally, it is common in American thinking to believe that all people have the likelihood of 
experiencing upward mobility, regardless of their economic standing at birth. Recent research, 
finds that while there is considerable mobility, there is also considerable persistence of income 
status.17 Intergenerational elasticity in earnings is estimated to be around 0.6 – this is the 
correlation in earnings between parents and their children in adulthood. This means that for a 
hypothetical family of four whose current income is at the poverty line, it would take the 
descendants of the family 5 to 6 generations (125 to 150 years) before their income will be 
within 5 percent of the national average.18 Estimates of intergenerational mobility are 
significantly lower for families with little or no wealth.19 African Americans and single mothers 
and their children are less likely to be upwardly mobile than other groups.20 
 
So what has been proven to cause these entries and reentries into poverty?  The first three 
sections of this brief focus on economic, employment, and human capital factors. Those are 
followed by a section on household composition factors, including teen parenthood, marital 
status, and female-headed households. The remaining sections discuss events and characteristics 
that may increase someone’s vulnerability to low earnings and poverty, such as having a criminal 
record, experiencing domestic violence, or living in a high poverty neighborhood. 
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3. What is the Relationship of Macroeconomic 
Performance to Poverty? 
 
Macroeconomic performance is commonly considered to be a key determinant of poverty.21 
There are clear business cycle effects with poverty rates declining with economic expansions and 
rising during recessions. A strong economy typically results in reduction in poverty because 
more jobs are created, unemployment drops, and wages increase. Recessions, on the other hand, 
have a disproportionate impact on lower-income families because they cause rising 
unemployment, a reduction in work hours, and the stagnation of family incomes – all of which 
have the greatest impact for those with the least income to begin with. 
 
Unemployment rates, 
wages, and inequality 
are used to measure 
the impact of 
economic performance 
on poverty, and all 
have rather 
consistently predicted 
poverty over the past 
two decades.22 To use 
one example, as 
shown in the Poverty 
Rates, Unemployment 
Rates and Median 
Wages, 1967-2003 
graphic, year-to-year 
changes in the 
poverty rate are 
roughly correlated 
(rising or falling) with 
unemployment.23  
 
 
Further refined analyses of the effects of increases in the unemployment rate find the following: 
• Overall, a one-percentage-point increase in the total unemployment rate in the 1990s, holding 
all other factors constant, resulted in an estimated four- to nine-tenths-percentage-points 
increase in the poverty rate.24   
• Each one-point increase in the unemployment rate of males aged 25 to 64 increases poverty by 
about 0.7 percentage points in the same year.25 26  
• Every one-percentage-point increase in the local area unemployment rate decreases the 
probability that less-educated black males are employed by 2.7 percentage points.27 
• Each one-percentage-point increase in unemployment is predicted to lower the growth of 
income among young families by 1.6 percent, with a diminishing impact of unemployment by 
age.28 
 
Graphic from Hoynes, et. al., 2005, p.46
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Low unemployment rates reduce poverty by increasing the likelihood that low-skilled, 
lower-wage workers will become employed or will work additional hours. Low 
unemployment has always disproportionately benefited less-skilled workers. When employment 
grows (resulting in a tight labor market), people who are previously unemployed, part-time 
workers, people who are underemployed, and those out of the labor market (all groups at 
increased risk of poverty) are most able to benefit. Employers rely on less traditional sources of 
labor, and are more likely to hire and train workers who might not have been considered for 
more skilled positions in a different economy when they have fewer openings.29 30 
Disadvantaged workers, including minorities, younger workers, high school dropouts, single 
mothers, and immigrants, had particularly strong wage gains in the latter part of the 1990s when 
the national economy was very strong and the unemployment rates were low.31  
 
Both the availability and the quality of employment significantly affect poverty. Recent 
structural changes in the economy of the United States, as evidenced by the decline of 
manufacturing sector jobs and the increasing role of the service sector employment, have a 
pronounced impact on low-skilled workers. There has been significant erosion of wages and 
compensation for workers resulting from the employment shift to low-paying industries since the 
1980s.32 As seen in the Poverty Rates, Unemployment Rates and Median Wages, 1967-2003 
figure, wages today are well below their levels in the 1970s. Service sector job growth represents 
the most prominent shift in employment occurring in metropolitan areas across the United States 
today.33 These jobs typically offer low-wages, part-time positions, and limited career potential or 
upward mobility. This changing economy has disproportionately hurt less-skilled workers who 
traditionally benefited from manufacturing jobs. In the face of severe deindustrialization, service 
jobs do very little to protect a community from becoming poor.34 
 
Ongoing employment shifts to the service sector reinforce continued African-American 
economic vulnerability, especially among less-educated workers. An African American 
individual living in a metropolitan area with a one-percentage point increase in the 
proportion of employment in the service sector was 27.4 percent less likely to exit poverty. 
African Americans’ were also less likely to exit poverty when living in metropolitan areas with a 
declining proportion of workers employed in manufacturing (both affect people who are black 
much more than whites, as people who are black are over-represented in these sectors).35  
 
Unionized workers typically earn higher wages than comparable non-union workers and 
historically unions have helped less educated workers obtain higher wages than they could get 
otherwise.36 In addition, unions raise the wages of minorities more than those of whites.37 The 
estimate of the degree to which union wages exceed non-union wages range from 14.7 percent to 
28.1 percent.38 However, unionization has declined dramatically: 43.1 percent of blue-collar 
workers were unionized in 1978 versus just 19.2 percent in 2005. The falling rate of 
unionization has lowered wages, not only because some workers no longer receive union 
wages, but also because there is less pressure on non-union employers to raise wages 39   
 
Forces largely seen as outside of the control of individuals have dramatic impacts on income, 
earnings, and poverty. Recessions, high unemployment, the decline in the manufacturing sector 
and growth in the service sector, and declining unionization depress earnings and increase 
poverty, particularly for disadvantaged workers.  
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4. What Aspects of Employment Trigger Entry into 
Poverty? 
 
Employment has a tremendous effect on earnings and consequently poverty. Important factors 
include job loss, declines in earnings, reductions in wages or hours worked, and growth in low-
wage sectors. 
 
Studies that test different events that trigger poverty find that the likelihood of entering or exiting 
poverty is highest for persons living in households with employment changes, when controlling 
for demographic and economic factors.40 Individuals in households that experience a loss of 
employment are the most likely to enter poverty. Nearly 20 percent of those entering poverty 
had a head of household lose a job.41 Looking more broadly at all adult workers in the 
household, more than 40 percent of people who enter poverty live in a household that 
experienced a job loss by the head, spouse, or other household member. Twenty-five percent of 
female-headed households enter poverty as a result of job loss.42  
 
Some research looked at declines in earnings more broadly instead of solely job loss and found 
these declines trigger poverty. Almost half (49.3%) of poverty spells begin when the 
household experiences a decline in earnings: 37.9 percent coincide with a fall in the household 
head's earnings and 11.4 percent of entries coincided with a fall in the spouse’s or other family 
member’s earnings.43 The amount of labor force attachment (weeks worked) is also a key 
indicator of whether or not someone will be poor. Among workers who do not have full-time, 
full-year employment, below poverty income is a substantial problem.44 In looking specifically at 
children’s entries into poverty, changes in the labor supply of secondary earners (other than head 
of household) as well as the head of household, coincides with children becoming poor.45 
 
Employment alone does not prevent entry into poverty if the wages are too low. As 
mentioned earlier, structural changes in the economy have contributed to a rise in low-wage 
employment. It is well established that workers at the lower end of the wage distribution have 
not fared well in recent decades, with the exception of the boom of the latter half of the 
nineties,46 and are on the receiving end of the worst the formal labor market has to offer. When 
available jobs are concentrated in low-skill occupations with shrinking wages, limited benefits, 
poor working conditions, and fluctuating schedules, labor force participation may not be 
sufficient to keep some workers and their families out of poverty.  
 
Over 29 million workers, or one-fourth (24.5%) of the workforce in the United States earns 
poverty level wages (the hourly wage that a full-time, year-round workers must earn to sustain a 
family of four at the poverty threshold).47 The average hourly wage for this group is $7.36 versus 
$18.07 for the total workforce. The workers are disproportionately female, minority, non-college 
educated, and new younger entrants into the workforce. They are more likely to work in retail 
trade and service industries and are less likely to work in durable manufacturing, transportation, 
finance and information services, and government.48 
 
 
9
 
Across the United States, 
median annual earnings 
of full-time, year-round 
workers fell in 2006, for 
the third year in a row, 
down about 1 percent for 
both men and women. In 
particular, African 
Americans have 
experienced large drops in 
median annual earnings 
since 2000, posting a loss 
of about $2,800 (or 8%) in 
inflation-adjusted 
dollars.49  
 
Women are much more 
likely to earn low wages 
than men. In 2005, 29.4 
percent of women earned 
poverty-level wages or less, significantly more than the share of men (19.9%). On average, 
women’s median wage is only 82 percent of that of men’s wages ($12.82 versus $15.64).50 
 
Some groups of workers, particularly minorities, are disadvantaged in the labor market due to 
discrimination by employers. In lieu of a criminal background check, some employers use race to 
infer past criminal activity and hence are much less likely to hire black men. It is estimated that 
such discrimination against black men reduces the demand for their labor by at least 10 
percent to 13 percent, with large implied effects on their wage and employment rates.51 
Studies find that people with and without criminal records who are black both receive many 
fewer job offers than their white counterparts in each category; in fact people with criminal 
records who are white generally receive as many job offers as people who are black without a 
record.52 
 
A number of workers, particularly in low-income neighborhoods, are attached to work via an 
underground economy or informal labor market and hence income is likely understated in many 
of the datasets. This type of ‘off the books’ employment typically results in workers 
experiencing unstable incomes and difficult working conditions.53 It is likely that much of the 
employment in this sector is not greatly reducing the risk of poverty. 
 
Employment and related changes, such as job loss by an adult in the household, joblessness, 
decline in earnings due to job changes, reduction in wages or hours worked, discrimination in 
hiring, and employment opportunities concentrated in low-wage sectors, greatly increase the 
likelihood that a household will become poor. Women are much more likely to earn poverty 
level wages, and black male workers have been especially affected by earnings decreases and 
discrimination in hiring. 
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5. How Does Human Capital Development Impact 
Employment and Poverty Chances? 
 
Human capital corresponds to the quality of jobs and earnings workers can expect to get. Level 
of educational attainment is probably the most important aspect of human capital development 
but job training, skills, work experience, and social networks also play important roles. A variety 
of studies show that a statistically significant effect of schooling exists with rates of return 
ranging as high as 16 percent per year.54  
 
Persons without a high school diploma are significantly more likely to be poor in the United 
States: 22.9 percent or 6.4 million people without a high school diploma are poor versus 
only 3.6 percent or 2 million people with a college degree or higher.55 
 
Education is a strong predictor of poverty status.56 Higher educational attainment of the 
household head is associated with a lower probability of entering poverty. Persons who live in 
households headed by individuals with more than a high school degree are the least likely to 
enter poverty, followed by persons in households where the head has a high school degree only. 
Those in households headed by persons with no high school degree are the most likely to 
enter poverty of any educational grouping.57 Conversely, persons with greater education 
levels and those who increase educational attainment have higher poverty exit rates.58 59 
 
Multiple studies have shown that high school dropouts are more frequently unemployed than 
graduates.60 As seen in the chart Unemployment 
rates by education, individuals without a high 
school degree on average experience 
unemployment rates that are 3 to 5 times greater 
than the rates experienced by individuals with a 
college degree or more.61 The more education an 
individual has, the more likely it is that he or she 
will become employed.62  
 
Despite the value of a high school degree in 
preventing poverty, high school non-completion 
rates are very high. Approximately one-third of 
high school students do not graduate after 4 years of 
high school.63 Almost 28 million adults age 25 and 
up in the United States in 2006 did not have a high 
school diploma or equivalent.64 Research indicates 
there are a number of factors, including Graphic from Valetta & Hodges, 2005, p3 
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socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, single-parent families, siblings’ educational attainment, and 
family mobility that are correlated with the likelihood of dropping out. Socioeconomic status, 
most commonly measured by parental income and education, has the strongest relationship to 
dropping out.65 
 
Multiple studies have shown that even when employed, high school dropouts earn less money.66 
Wages have declined considerably for those without a diploma. The economic status of 
young dropouts has plummeted since the late 1970s. Employment and earnings prospects have 
declined, with earnings declining in absolute terms and also relative to the incomes of those with 
more education.  
• The earning power of 25- to 34-year-old dropouts who work full time for a full year (in 
constant 2002 dollars) has been in steady decline, during a developmental phase vital to 
getting established in the workforce and as an independent adult, and to forming 
families.67 
• In 1971, 25- to 34-year-old male dropouts earned $35,087 annually on average, (in 2002 
dollars), falling to $22,903 in 2002, a decline of 35%. In the same period, the earnings of 
female dropouts fell from $19,888 to $17,114. For female dropouts the average earnings 
would keep a three-person family out of poverty but not a four-person family. The 
average 25- to 34-year-old dropout in this age group working full-time for a full-year is 
hovering around poverty-level earnings in terms of supporting a family.68 
• Earnings also fell for high school graduates though not as severely as earnings for those 
without a high school diploma.69  
 
In addition to education, work experience and skills play a role in labor market success or failure. 
Poverty is endemic among individuals with no work experience – roughly 1 in 5 people with no 
work experience in the previous year were poor.70 A number of market changes have made it 
harder for less-skilled to earn their way out of poverty including changes in productive 
technologies, globalization of labor markets, and movement of jobs from central cities to 
suburbs.71  
 
Education correlates with earnings, and employment status and school failure is a good predictor 
of future economic status. Employment and earnings prospects have declined for those without a 
high school diploma, with earnings declining in absolute terms and also relative to the incomes 
of those with more education. There was a time when a high school diploma was sufficient to 
prevent poverty entry but that day is no longer. It actually took relatively more education and 
work hours to lift children out of poverty in 1999 than in 1969.72 The economic disadvantage of 
lower education levels is hard to overcome without increasing one’s education.  
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6. What Household Composition Factors Increase the 
Likelihood that a Family will Enter Poverty? 
 
A number of household composition factors including having children, teen parenthood, marital 
status, and female-headed households are highly correlated with income and poverty. These 
disproportionately impact women and children. 
 
In terms of household structure, households headed by women are far more likely to be poor than 
other types of households. There are 4.1 million female-headed families in poverty and 2.9 
million married-couple families in poverty; in total over 14.4 million households are headed by 
women.73 Half of all women will potentially experience single motherhood at some point in 
their lifetimes; 80 percent of black women and 45 percent of white women will become family 
heads at some time during their childbearing years.74 In 2000, the distribution of female-headed 
household types with children was as follows: 12 percent were headed by a woman with a 
cohabitating male partner, 14.3 percent were headed by a grandmother, and 73.8 percent by a 
single mother. A larger share of the households headed by a grandmother is black.75  
 
Poverty rates in female-headed households are typically 3 to 4 times as high as those for the 
overall population.76 Individuals in households that become headed by a female are extremely 
likely to enter into poverty: 
• When a two-adult household becomes a female-headed household, 20.1 percent entered 
poverty.77  
• The transition to a female-headed family accounts for 59 percent of the poverty 
beginnings for female heads with children: 38 percent of these poverty spell 
beginnings result from a marital breakup and 21 percent result from what is most likely 
unmarried motherhood.78  
• Persons in households that have been female-headed for 2 or more years are more likely 
enter poverty than persons in two-adult and single male-headed households.79 
• More than 6 out of 10 children who have experienced persistent or long-term 
poverty have spent time in single parent families.80  
 
Many female-headed households begin with a divorce. Nationally, over 13 million women are 
divorced, and 18.4 percent of them are living in poverty.81 Divorce erodes the economic well-
being of custodial parents and their children. There is considerable evidence that upon divorce 
women and children experience substantial financial declines, with income dropping; 
divorced men’s relative income, on the other hand, remains stable or even increases.82 Median 
household income for custodial parent households declines 40 percent, on average, during 
the 5 years following divorce. Moreover, the decline in economic well-being held for poorly 
educated and highly educated couples alike.83 Of those experiencing a new marital break-up, 23 
percent become poor with the month that the break-up occurs (31% for female-headed families, 
19% for families with elderly members).84 A father leaving the family increases the likelihood 
that families with children will be poor: in one study the percent of families below poverty 
increased by ten percentage points (about a 46% increase in the total number of families).85 
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Female-headed households’ status is closely tied to poverty because single parent families 
typically have just one potential earner and are less likely than married parents to have a full-
time worker. When there is only one adult earner in the household, fewer hours are worked and 
fewer hours are available to be worked due to care giving responsibilities. Though employment 
rates are high for single women with children (almost 80% work)86, mothers who never 
marry are 70 percent less likely to be working full time compared to women who have only 
marital births.87 If there is not another earner in the household, grandmother-headed households 
with children have extremely high odds of experiencing poverty, significantly higher (40%) than 
those headed by a single mother.88  
 
Having children impacts income generation and income needed to make ends meet. At its 
simplest, having children increases household size, increases the amount of income needed to 
make ends meet, and likely reduces the number of hours the parent can work, thereby increasing 
the risk of poverty. It is estimated that 8.6% of poverty entries happen when a child is born into a 
household, and 1 of every 5 spells of poverty for children begin this way.89 In families with a 
new baby, 12.9 percent become poor in the month the event occurred; this percent increases 
to 24.6 percent for female-headed households.90 It is estimated that 6.5 percent of poverty entries 
happen when a child under age 6 enters the household. The likelihood of entering poverty is 
higher for persons in households with more children.91 
 
In 2006, 38.5 percent of children born in the United States were born to unmarried mothers (over 
1.6 million births).92 Over half of all children born in the United States today will, if current 
trends continue, spend some time living apart from one of their biological parents (while 
growing up.93 High divorce rates, falling marriage rates, and rising non-marital birthrates over 
the past three decades have more than doubled the share of children living with single mothers.94  
 
Half of all non-marital childbearing starts during the teen years.95 In 2006, the birthrate of teenage 
females aged 15-19 was 41.9 births per 1,000, 96 (though it is important to note that the teen birth 
rate has generally been declining since the early 1990s). 97 Women who have had teenage and 
post-teenage non-marital births fare particularly badly economically – one study 
documented that 55 percent were officially poor.98 Teen parenthood is associated with both 
lower high school graduation rates and a roughly 20 percent reduction in the girls’ adult income.99 
Women with post-adolescent non-marital births who did not have teenage births were 
substantially better off than those who did – their median income was nearly double and their 
poverty rate (20%) was less than half than that of those with adolescent births.100  In addition to 
increasing poverty risk, having a non-marital birth substantially lowers women’s future 
incomes.101  
 
The financial strength of women and children is compromised by certain household structure 
characteristics. About half of all women will experience single motherhood at some point in their 
lifetimes and half of all children will live in a single parent-headed household. Attributes of 
female-headed households that are associated with poverty include: having children in the 
household under age 6, being of younger age, not being married, being black or Hispanic, and 
not participating in the labor force.102 Female-headed households are disproportionately poor due 
to lower wages paid to women, fewer hours worked in households with one adult earner, and 
fewer hours available to work due to care giving responsibilities. 
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7.  How Are Disability and Poor Health Linked to Poverty? 
 
Households that have an adult with a health problem or disability which prevents them from 
working or which limits the kind or amount of work they can do are at heightened risk for 
economic insecurity. These health conditions can result from a myriad of things including a birth 
defect, accident, illness, and environmental causes.  
 
In the United States, 12.9 percent of adults ages 21 to 64 have a disability (almost 21.5 million 
people),103 11.6 percent report fair/poor health, and 8.1 percent report poor mental health.104 
These conditions are much more prevalent in the low-income population as in the total 
adult population: 25.1 percent of low-income adults report fair/poor health and 15.2 
percent report poor mental health.105 The fraction of the population reporting work limitations 
due to health or disability rises dramatically with age. In addition, many Americans have 
disabilities that do not qualify them for the major government programs that provide cash 
grants106 - that is they are not considered disabled enough by government definitions to prevent 
working, yet they are not succeeding in the labor market. 
 
When a head of household becomes disabled, 6.4 percent of households enter poverty.107 
The disability status of the household head has powerful effects on the prevalence of children’s 
poverty. In families where the household head was disabled during a 15-year period children 
who are black could expect to be poor in almost 11 of the 15 years and white children could 
expect to be poor 3.3 of 15 years.108  
 
People without disabilities are more than twice as likely to be employed as those with a 
disability.109 Over one third (37.2%) of people with disabilities are working compared to 75.1 
percent of people without.110 Even among people with disabilities who are employed, the hours 
worked and dollars earned are substantially less than for those without disabilities.111 People with 
a health-related work limitation have significantly lower household income, on average, than 
respondents who are not employed but report no such limitation. They also receive a much lower 
fraction of their income from earnings. Poor health leads many older workers (aged 50 to 62) to 
withdraw from the labor force. Among people in poor health, more than half who exit the labor 
force apply for disability benefits.112 Individuals with an early onset of disability (before age 22) 
have higher rates of employment than those with a later onset of disability.113 
 
Many children with disabilities do not graduate from high school or go on to further 
education, and many are not adequately prepared for the workforce.114 People ages 22 to35 
with an early onset of disability (before age 22), have a lower probability of completing high 
school (33.3% versus 12.7%) and a lower probability of being employed (38.1% versus 80.7%) 
than those without disabilities. Younger workers with disabilities are significantly more likely to 
work part-time (40.9%) than workers without disabilities (14.6%). Young people with 
disabilities receive significantly lower earnings than people without disabilities ($1,000 per 
month versus $1,800 per month).115 
 
Lower employment rates of people with disabilities that began when they were young and 
the consequent low incomes are caused by lower levels of high school completion and a 
direct negative impact of disability on work.116 Barriers to employment for persons with 
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disabilities include the need for specific work accommodations, difficulties in accessing 
transportation and personal supports or assisting technologies, and the need for health 
insurance.117 Many workers with disabilities work fewer hours are therefore likely to have lower 
total earnings; this may be a result of their disability or it may reflect the types of jobs people 
with disabilities are more likely to be hired to perform.118 
 
Child disability rates have grown substantially in recent decades. Some children with disabilities 
require additional or specialized care relative to other children, and their mothers may be less 
available to work, or to work full time due to care-giving responsibilities. A number of studies 
provide evidence that the presence of one or more children with a disability has a negative 
influence on the paid employment of mothers.119 120 In a study of welfare recipients, mothers 
with a child who is severely disabled, or more than one child with moderately disabilities, were 
20 to 30 percent less likely to have worked in the previous month than mothers with healthier 
children. Having a child with a severe disability but not receiving disability income increased the 
likelihood by as much as 30 percent that the family would experience material hardship.121 Not 
working or reducing hours worked to take care of the needs of a child with disabilities can have 
severe economic consequences for many single-parent families. 
 
A head of household becoming disabled has powerful and consistent effects on the prevalence of 
children’s poverty. This is in part due the fact that the presence of a disability can significantly 
reduce labor force attachment. Even among people employed with disabilities, the hours worked 
and dollars earned are substantially less than for those without disabilities. Poor health leads 
many older workers to leave the labor market before retirement age. Finally, having a child with 
a disability puts families at risk of economic insecurity, particularly single-parent-headed 
households.  
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8. How Does the Rise in Men with Criminal Records 
Decrease Economic Chances for Themselves and Their 
Families? 
 
Incarceration interrupts participation in the labor force and the generation of earnings, has long-
term consequences on employment and earnings chances and may have ripple effects that 
disproportionately negatively impact the economic security of certain groups.  
 
Incarceration is at its highest point on record and is distributed unequally across the 
population. All told, 1 in 37 adults in the United States have ever served time in prison (over 5.6 
million as of 2001). An estimated 16.6 percent of adult black males were current or former State 
or Federal prisoners – a rate that was twice that of Hispanic males (7.7%) and 6 times that of 
white males (2.6%) in 2001. Female incarceration rates are significantly lower but follow similar 
racial and ethnic disparities. Nearly 1 in 15 (6.6%) of all persons born in the United States in 
2001 will go to State or Federal prison during their lifetime, up from 1.9 percent in 1974. If 
current incarceration rates remain unchanged, about 1 in 3 black males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males 
and 1 in 17 white males are expected to go to prison during their lifetimes. Nearly 9 times as 
many men as women have ever been in prison. A male has a 1 in 9 chance of ever going to 
prison while a female has a 1 in 56 chance.122 
 
Those who are incarcerated average less than 12 years of completed schooling. High school 
dropouts are 3 to 4 times as likely to be in prison as those with 12 years of schooling. The 
risks of incarceration are highly stratified by education. By the end of the 1990s a black male 
high school dropout born in the late 1960s had a 60 percent chance of serving time in prison 
(about 3 times higher than 20 years earlier), and one without college education had a 30 percent 
chance.123  
 
Considerable empirical evidence points to negative effects of incarceration on the subsequent 
employment and earnings of those who spent time in prison. Wage levels, wage growth, and 
weeks worked are all significantly lower among those with criminal records than those 
without them. Studies show only 30 to 40 percent of people with criminal records generally 
showing any employment per quarter, with quarterly earnings of those working often averaging 
around $2,000.124 Incarceration reduces the wages of people who were formerly 
incarcerated by 10 to 20 percent and reduces wage growth by almost one third.125 
 
The increasing proportion of black men that are either currently or formerly incarcerated is likely 
to suppress their relative socioeconomic status.126 Previous incarceration is particularly 
associated with large declines in employment and labor force participation among young 
black men. For percentage point rise in the overall incarceration rate of black men, employment 
and labor force participation among younger black men (not incarcerated) declined by 1.0 to 1.5 
percent.127  
 
Youth detained in correctional facilities have higher unemployment rates and receive lower 
wages a decade or more after incarceration. On average, youth incarceration reduces future 
employment by about 5 percent, or about 3 weeks per year. The effect is particularly large for 
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black youth who were previously incarcerated; their employment is reduced by about 9%, or 
around five weeks in the year. Adult employment lost through youth incarceration exceeds the 
large negative effects of dropping out of high school or living in a high unemployment area. The 
negative impacts of youth incarceration do not appear to decay over time with the negative 
impact being extremely long lasting. Even after 15 years those incarcerated as juveniles worked 
between 5 and 10 percent less than those who were not incarcerated as youth.128 
 
Once they are released, people with criminal records have a long-term reduced prospect of 
stable employment and adequate earnings over their life course.129  
• A felony record can disqualify employment in certain occupations including jobs with 
contact with children, certain health services occupations, and employment with firms 
providing security services.  
• Once released, success in the labor market might be reduced for a variety of supply-based 
reasons, such as the fact that their human capital or skills depreciate over time, their 
information about the job market weakens, and their networks atrophy.130 
• In all surveys of employers that asked about their willingness to hire people with criminal 
records, employer responses reveal a strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal 
records, stronger than their aversion to hiring other groups of stigmatized workers.131 
Over 60 percent of employers who have recently hired low-skilled workers indicate 
that they would ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ be willing to hire an applicant 
with a criminal record.132 
• Employers may be unwilling to hire applicants with criminal records for many reasons- 
such as the risk of legal liability if they harm a customer or coworker, the risk of financial 
liability if they engage in theft, fears of personal violence, and the negative signals that a 
period of incarceration sends about an applicant’s general skills or trustworthiness.133 
• Those released from prison, facing reduced employment prospects, may not succeed in 
the labor market, likely raising recidivism rates (i.e., returns to prison). The employment 
of people who are formerly incarcerated is quite negatively correlated with their tendency 
to re-offend and recidivate.134  
 
A number of studies of families of prisoners highlight the resulting financial instability and 
severe financial strain. Imprisonment of a parent can alter the prospects of a family in a number 
of significant ways, especially if the family becomes headed by a single parent.135 In addition, 
serving a prison sentence can result in the lengthy absence of African American males from their 
spouses, partners, and children is likely to hamper family formation and hasten the dissolution of 
existing, if not stable, family units.136 
 
Having a criminal record is becoming an increasingly common characteristic, particularly so in 
the life course of black males. The experience of imprisonment is linked with risk of 
unemployment and low earnings due to stigma, interruptions one’s work/career history, and 
declines in job skills. The reduced employment and earnings of fathers likely reduce the family 
incomes of their children and may have intergenerational consequences. “One might argue that 
in light of the potentially permanent consequences of an incarceration spell, the high 
incarceration rate among black males is perhaps one of the chief barriers to their socioeconomic 
progress.”137 
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9. Does Being an Immigrant Impact the Likelihood of 
Being Poor?  
 
There has been much speculation about the impact of immigration on the economy, labor market 
chances and poverty. Much of the discussion has focused on opinion and not on empirical 
evidence. Research does shed some light on the implications of growing immigration on 
economic security, and in general finds that negative effects have been overstated. 
 
The foreign-born population comprises about 12.6 percent of the population of the United States 
at more than 37 million people.138 Best estimates determine that there are between 7 and 11 
million undocumented immigrants in the United States representing one quarter of the overall 
foreign-born population.139 One in five children in the United States and one in four low-income 
children lives in an immigrant family.140  Most children of immigrants in the United States are 
born in the United States and 75 percent are citizens.141 Approximately 700,000 to 900,000 
documented immigrants and at least 300,000 to 500,000 undocumented immigrants arrive each 
year. If these trends persist and immigration policies of the 1990s continue, the foreign-born 
population is projected to double by 2050, when it will account for 15 percent of the total 
population of the United States. This would be the same level of immigration that existed in 
1900.142 It is important to note that not all immigrants who enter the United States stay there 
permanently – it is widely believed that as many as one-third eventually return to their countries 
of origin.143 
 
The recent rise in immigration has had a very minor affect on the poverty rate.144 One study 
found that increases in the foreign-born population since 1980 have increased the poverty 
rate by about 0.3 percent more than it otherwise would have been.145 Another study shows 
that if immigration had been held constant, poverty rates would have been only slightly lower 
and median income slightly higher between 1993 and 2000. Specifically, if the shares of 
immigrants and non-immigrants were frozen at 1993 levels (9%), the overall poverty rate would 
have been 12.6 percent; instead the immigrant population grew to 12 percent, and the national 
poverty rate was essentially unchanged at 12.7 percent (only one–tenth of a percentage point 
higher). The decline in immigrant poverty has almost fully offset the effect of the growth in the 
immigrant population.146 
 
Immigration was neither the sole nor most important factor determining poverty rates in 
the past decade. Immigration’s role in recent poverty trends appears to have been overstated at 
the expense of other economic factors, including increasing inequality and unemployment that 
hurt the economic prospects of all low-wage workers, not just immigrants.147  Roughly half of 
the increase in immigrant child poverty from 1969-1999 can be attributed to changing 
conditions in the United States economy that make it more difficult to lift a family out of 
poverty (both immigrant and native) than 30 years ago.148 
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While some immigrants have higher poverty rates than native-born individuals, their 
likelihood of being poor has fallen. Immigrant poverty rates have fallen nearly 3 times as 
fast as did those of non-immigrants in recent years, as shown in the chart Poverty rates for all 
persons, U.S. natives, immigrants, and recent immigrants 1994-2000.149 Immigrants also 
experienced greater increases in real median family incomes than did native-born individuals (an 
increase of 26.3 percent from 1994 to 2000, while native-born grew half that fast).150 The longer 
immigrants live in the United States, the more similar to the native-born population in social and 
economic status they become. Median family income has risen over time for immigrants and is 
now as high as that of natives for immigrants who entered the country before 1980.151   
 
Immigrants are increasingly a large share of the labor force of the United States (1 of every 7 
workers or 14%); however, immigrants are over-represented among low-wage workers (1 of 
every 5 workers or 20%). Immigrants’ hourly wages are lower on average than those of native-
born workers, and nearly half earn less than twice the minimum wage. Two million immigrant 
workers earned less than the minimum wage. The average low-wage immigrant worker 
earned $14,400 in 2001.152 Though virtually all undocumented men are in the labor force (96%), 
they earn considerably less than working American citizens.153 This is in large part because 
immigrants without legal status have restricted access to jobs, are ineligible for most social 
programs, and cannot become citizens. About two-thirds of undocumented workers earn less 
than twice the minimum wage, compared with only one-third of all workers.154    
 
Graphic from Chapman, 2003, p 12 
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It is widely thought that the recent surge in low-skilled immigration has produced a growing pool 
of workers with very low reservation wages (the wage at which workers will agree to offer their 
services) and no bargaining power,155 and many attribute this to depressing wages for other low-
skilled workers. The academic literature on this is contentious, though there is rough consensus 
that large surges of immigration have generated, at most, small negative wage effects for less 
advantaged members of the labor force.156 Most research shows that a 10 percent increase in 
the fraction of immigrants in the population reduces the wages of the least-skilled native-
born workers by, at most, 1 percent.157 Upon reviewing the literature on this, economists, 
Rachel Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt concluded that “given the widespread nature of the popular 
view that immigration has large adverse effects on the economic outcomes of the native-born 
population of the United States, there is surprisingly little evidence to support this. Evidence of 
immigrants reducing employment or labor-force participation rates or increasing the 
unemployment rate is even harder to find.”158 
 
Different groups come to the United States with differing levels of education, job skills, and 
other human capital assets that impact earnings. Beyond their human capital the legal status of 
immigrants also strongly affects their social and economic characteristics and chances.159 Despite 
these challenges, immigrants, particularly men, have very high rates of employment. 
Unfortunately these jobs are often concentrated in low-paying sectors, resulting in higher poverty 
rates. However, immigration was not the most important factor in affecting poverty rates in the 
past decade; instead more fundamentally economic factors, such as increasing inequality and 
unemployment hurt the economic prospects of all low-wage workers, not just immigrants.  
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10. Does Having Experienced Violence Increase the Risk 
of Economic Insecurity for Women? 
 
Unfortunately, women encounter different types of violence in their lives including rape, 
physical assault, and domestic violence that may have financial consequences in addition to the 
more obvious health and safety consequences. Research on these issues is somewhat limited, due 
to limited data sets and a focus on outcomes other than financial. The majority of the research 
reported here is from surveys that took place in specified geographies, with some of the surveys 
further focused on low-income women. 
 
The National Violence Against Women Survey found that in the previous 12 months, 302,091 
women experienced rape, and 1,913,243 experienced physical assault, for a total of over 2 
million women experiencing violence within the preceding year. Throughout their lifetime 1 in 6 
women in the United States experienced an attempted or completed rape, and 1 in 2 (52%) 
experienced a physical assault. Many assaults against women are committed by an intimate 
partner: 25 percent of surveyed women said they were raped and/or physically assaulted by a 
current or former spouse, a co-habitating partner, or a date at some point in their life.160 
Prevalence of intimate partner violence is much higher among welfare recipients: estimates range 
from 63 to 75 percent reporting serious physical abuse by an intimate partner in their lifetimes.161 
 
The results of a random household survey with 824 women from a low-income neighborhood 
showed that women who reported having experienced violence were more likely to have 
lower personal incomes than women who had not: 
• Those who reported being controlled, harassed, or threatened (or experiencing other 
symbolic aggression) in the past 12 months reported incomes $215 lower than those who 
had not.   
• Those who reported being pushed, shoved, or grabbed (or other physical aggression) 
reported incomes $211 lower than those who had not. 
• Those who had experienced beatings or rape (or other severe aggression) reported 
incomes $997 lower than those who had not been severely aggressed against.162 
 
Women who are physically or sexually assaulted go on to experience increased risk for poverty, 
divorce, and unemployment. Research shows that women who were living above the poverty 
level initially were at increased risk for decline into poverty following sexual or physical assault. 
New victimization was particularly harmful for women who had been previously assaulted 
and who were not living in poverty initially- this doubled the likelihood that these women 
would become poor over time. In addition, women with a history of having experienced 
violence who experienced a new assault were more than twice as likely to be unemployed than 
women who did not experience a new assault.163  
 
Domestic violence can trigger poverty in different ways including decreasing employment 
stability of the woman, causing formation of female-headed households, and causing formation 
of new households that have no personal assets or income due to the violence. Research shows 
that women who have experienced domestic violence are at risk of subsequent disruption in 
employment and reduced income following victimization.164 Because many women who have 
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experienced domestic violence are economically dependent on the men who abuse them, few 
have the resources necessary to start over for themselves and their children. For example, many 
abused women do not have ready access to cash, checking accounts, or charge accounts.165 
One study showed that 27 percent of abused women had no access to cash, 34 percent had no 
access to a checking account, 51 percent had no access to charge accounts, and 22 percent had no 
access to a car.166  
 
Some women remain trapped in abusive relationships because they lack resources to leave and 
know that poverty and material hardship may result.167 Most women try to leave the abuser: 50 
to 90 percent of women attempt to escape their abusive environments.168 Their efforts to leave 
the abuser are severely hindered by the economic deprivation that frequently accompanies 
domestic violence and by the volatile response by the abuser.169 Women who flee abuse usually 
take their children with them and thus have additional financial responsibilities that contribute to 
poverty.170 In addition, they frequently must leave quickly and secretly without time to pack and 
hence need to essentially repurchase all of the essentials needed for themselves and their 
children.  
 
The interaction between employment and having experienced violence is complicated, and it is 
not exactly clear how the violence women experience affects them as workers.171 One study 
indicates that cumulative domestic violence has a long-term impact on women’s capacity to be 
economically self-sufficient.172 Another study found that the combination of physical and 
sexual abuse as an adult was associated with employment instability, such as having more 
jobs, fewer months of work, lower hourly wages, and fewer hours of work per week.173 
Higher levels of recent violence have also been associated with fewer months worked. The effect 
of violence on employment is significant even in the presence of other work-related factors such 
as human capital.174 Finally, abuse can interfere with a woman’s job stability by increasing the 
risk of serious physical- and mental-health problems.175 Research shows that psychological 
distress is significantly associated with unemployment for women with a history of domestic 
violence.176 
 
A number of qualitative and quantitative studies reveal that abusers did not support and often 
prevented employment. Abused women are 10 times more likely to have a current or former 
partner who would not like them going to school or work, compared to women who did not have 
an abusive partner,177 potentially leaving them without the work experience, education and up-to-
date skills needed to succeed in the workforce. Approximately 16 to 60 percent of women 
surveyed in five studies had partners had discouraged them from working, and 33 to 46 percent 
said that their partner prevented them from working.178 179 Abusers interfere with employment in 
many ways: keeping women up all night before a job interview, turning off the alarm clock, 
destroying clothing, inflicting visible facial injuries, deliberately disabling the family car, 
threatening to kidnap the children from child care centers, failing to show up as promised for 
child care or transportation, and in-person harassment on the job.180 A survey of abused women 
who were working at the time the abuse occurred found that 56 percent of their partners had 
harassed them at work by phone or in person and 21 percent of their partners frequently harassed 
them at work. In two other studies, approximately 35 to 40 percent of the women surveyed said 
their abuser had shown up at their place of work and caused a disruption.181 
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This interference with employment by the abuser puts the woman being abused at risk of losing 
her job. Three of the studies that interviewed women who had experienced domestic violence 
who were working when the abuse occurred found that 44 to 60 percent had been 
reprimanded at work for behaviors related to the abuse, such as being late to work, and 24 
to 52 percent said they lost their jobs because of the abuse.182 Almost 70 percent of the 
respondents to one survey said that their job performance was negatively affected by the abuse, 
and about 50 percent said that they felt they had lost opportunities for salary and career 
advancement because of problems related to abuse.183  
 
Violence appears to put women at risk of economic insecurity in a number of ways. Certain 
types of violence and the number of events increases the likelihood a women will become poor. 
Violence interacts with employment, in some cases increasing unemployment or decreasing 
hours worked. As many women who have experienced domestic violence are economically 
dependent on the men who abuse them, few have the resources necessary to start over for 
themselves and their children. Abusers interfere with employment in a myriad of ways that 
increase job instability and job loss and compromise movement toward economic self-reliance. 
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11. What are the Economic Consequences of Living in 
Disproportionately Poor Neighborhoods? 
 
There is a growing body of theory indicating that neighborhoods play an important role in 
perpetuating poverty across generations. However, studies have not isolated exactly what about 
neighborhoods make a difference.184 185 Neighborhood factors are complex and interactive, 
making them hard to isolate in research. Therefore, much of this section should be understood as 
contextually relevant to understanding poverty, but not a delineation of proven causal factors of 
poverty.  
 
One in 10 people who are poor live in communities with high concentrations of poverty, 
where over 40 percent of the residents are poor.186 These are typically racially segregated 
neighborhoods that are economically declining and neglected, lacking economic and institutional 
and resources.187 Key community institutions, including businesses, school, churches, and 
community organizations have declined or disappeared leaving residents cutoff from key 
institutional resources.188 Studies have found that outcomes are worse for people who are black 
that reside in segregated urban areas. Young black adults between the ages of 20 and 30 were 
less likely to have graduated from high school or college, more likely to be idle (less likely to 
have a job or be in school), more likely to earn less income, and more likely to be a single 
mother if they lived in a highly of a less segregated area.189 
 
To understand the neighborhood role, it is important to look at how people come to live in 
neighborhoods. Residential choices are largely influenced by housing/rental prices and by 
discrimination. Residing in an area of concentrated poverty is often the result of the 
affordability of the housing in those neighborhoods and persistent discrimination in the 
housing market. For example, black renters face a 10.7 percent change of being totally excluded 
from housing made available to white renters with similar characteristics, and a 23.3 percent 
chance of learning about fewer apartments.190 One estimate finds that this discrimination could 
discourage as much as 20 percent of the moves that would otherwise be made by black 
households.191 
 
There has been a devastating impact of manufacturing losses on the economic prospects for 
low-skilled minority workers in general and for inner-city residents in particular.192 193 It is 
thought that the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs that employed many less-educated black 
workers from high poverty minority neighborhoods reduces the chances of the remaining 
residents and their children of escaping poverty. Industrial restructuring and the shift of 
manufacturing employment from the cities to the suburbs mean that the number of jobs available 
and compatible with the skills of residents living in concentrated poverty neighborhoods has 
dropped. One result is that many high poverty minority neighborhoods across the United States 
have lost the workforce that is necessary to sustain viable labor market activity. These factors 
increase male unemployment, reduce the pool of men eligible for marriage, and so reduce 
marriage rates in the inner city and increase the number of children raised in single parent 
families.194 195  
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When low-skilled jobs move to suburban areas, housing markets do not always adjust to make 
lower-income housing available. In many instances zoning and building restrictions may prohibit 
multi-unit housing, which is generally more affordable. As a result segregated housing patterns 
keep low-income households in the central city with reduced access to low-skill jobs in 
suburban areas. This spatial mismatch, however, is difficult to test with research. Studies have 
found that access to jobs heavily influences employment for both minority and white youth; that 
average access to jobs is much higher for whites than for blacks or Hispanics; and that 
differences in job access explain 25 to 30 percent of the unemployment gap between white and 
Hispanic youth, and one-third to one-half of the employment gap between black and white 
youth.196 197 A comparison of public housing residents from the city who moved to the suburbs 
with those who moved within the city, found that those in the suburbs were 25 percent more 
likely to have a job than those in the city. It also found that the older non-college bound youth 
who had moved to the suburbs were more likely to work full-time, were 4 times as likely to earn 
over $6.50 per hour, and were more likely to have a job with benefits than those who stayed in 
the city.198 
 
At the same time jobs left, the migration of the middle-class residents out of the inner city 
weakened important socializing institutions, reduced the exposure of poverty-area residents to 
mainstream values and norms, reduced job-finding networks, and reduced the number of work 
role models.199 It is well established that social networks can help a person find out about a job, 
get hired into a position, learn how to do the job, and retain the job.200 Support from social 
networks is especially important when employers are likely to discriminate on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, work experience, home address, age, or gender.201 Approximately 50 percent of all 
workers at a point in time knew someone at their firm when they first took the job. Poor 
communities may be less able to generate labor market information necessary for matching 
community members to jobs, in part because they are isolated from mainstream 
opportunities for work.202   
 
Segregation and discrimination in housing serve to separate low-income minority children 
into schools where poverty rates are relatively high and student performance is relatively 
low.203  The ensuing educational disparities translate into earnings disparities, and hence into 
higher poverty for blacks and Hispanics.204 A lack of role models in the neighborhood seems to 
contribute to low educational attainment. If the children within a community consider the 
experiences of adults in assessing the economic payoff of education, children in poor 
communities observe biased outcomes in the sense that the observed payoff among adults in the 
community is lower than what the child should expect, creating the possibility that poor children 
are systematically misinformed about the benefits of education and therefore make lower 
educational choices.205 
 
Middle class out-migration also means that poverty area residents have few examples of 
mainstream success, and this limits their expectations about what is possible for them.206 
This further increases the neighborhood’s social isolation, defined as ‘the lack of contact or of 
sustained interaction with individuals and institutions that represent mainstream society’.207 
Sociologists argue that social isolation virtually condemned residents of the of high poverty 
minority neighborhoods to a lifetime of jobless poverty through negative role models, the failure 
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to connect school success to labor market mobility, and the formlessness of days unstructured by 
the discipline of work life.208  
 
Residential segregation, housing and labor market discrimination, joblessness, and the migration 
of middle class residents are common in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and 
may constrain economic opportunities and choices across generations. Studies show that growing 
up in a high poverty neighborhood may have a negative impact on economic outcomes and may 
explain some of the disproportionately high rates of poverty in minority groups. There is no 
consensus, however, about the magnitude of the neighborhood effects on economic and other 
outcomes.209 Concentrated poverty does appear to have a negative impact on educational 
performance, and hence contributes to lower earnings potential and ultimately to poverty.210 
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12. Summary of Findings 
 
Poverty is widespread and will touch the majority of Americans at some point during their 
lifetimes. What emerges out of a review of the literature is a picture of a heterogeneous poor 
population with different triggers for entry into poverty. Certain groups are disproportionately 
impacted and certain events are more influential for various subgroups within the at-risk-of-
poverty population than they are for others.  
 
What groups are more likely to be poor?  
 
• Women face greater risk of poverty than men and comprise a greater number of all 
people in poverty. 
• Minorities face greater risk of poverty than whites yet comprise a somewhat smaller 
number of all people in poverty. 
• Children face greater risk of poverty than any other age group yet comprise a somewhat 
smaller number of all people in poverty. 
• Immigrants face greater risk of poverty than native-born individuals, but comprise a 
much smaller number of all people in poverty. 
• People with disabilities face greater risk of poverty then those without, yet comprise a 
much smaller number of all people in poverty. 
• Female-headed households are at a far greater risk of poverty than married-couple 
families, and represent a greater number of all families in poverty. 
 
What events are more likely to push people into poverty? 
 
• Loss of a job: nearly 20 percent of people enter poverty when the head of household loses 
a job. 
• Decline in earnings: half of poverty spells begin with the household experiences a decline 
in earnings. 
• No high school degree: households headed by someone without a high school degree 
have a high likelihood of entering poverty. 
• Female-headed household: When a two-adult household becomes a female-headed 
household 20.1 percent entered poverty. 
• Having children: 8.6 percent of poverty entries happen when a child is born into a 
household. 
• Disability: when a head of household becomes disabled, 6.5 percent of households enter 
poverty. 
 
What contributes to these events happening? 
 
Forces largely seen as outside of the control of individuals have dramatic impacts on income, 
earnings, and poverty. Recessions, high unemployment, the decline in the manufacturing sector 
and growth in the service sector, and declining unionization depress earnings and increase 
poverty, particularly for disadvantaged workers. A healthy economy alone, while integral to 
preventing poverty, does not prevent all entries into poverty. Many people at risk of poverty have 
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circumstances that prevent them from entering the labor market or that limits their wages or the 
hours they work: 
• Growth in low-wage work: one-fourth of the workforce in the United States earns 
poverty level wages, particularly impacting women and minorities. 
• Discrimination: estimates suggest that discrimination against black men reduces the 
demand for their labor by at least 10 to13 percent. 
• Wage declines for dropouts: high school dropouts earn less money than those with more 
education and their wages have declined considerably. 
• Teen births: half of all non-marital childbearing starts during the teen years which is 
associated with lower high school graduation and a 20 percent reduction in the girl’s 
adult income. 
• Not working full time: this is particularly prevalent for single parents and people with 
disabilities or parents caring for children with disabilities. 
• Increased incarceration experience: previous incarceration reduces wages by 10 to 20 
percent and increases likelihood of unemployment, particularly for black men. 
• Violence: having experienced violence increases employment instability for some women 
and leaving an abuser can render a woman without any income. 
• High poverty neighborhoods: segregation, discrimination, the decline in jobs, and the loss 
of positive role models constrain current opportunities and future aspirations for poor 
minority residents. 
 
This deeper look at causes of poverty provides a solid jumping off point for policy and system 
change. By understanding the specific triggers that increase the likelihood that someone will 
experience poverty, we can better target our interventions and investments. There is a spectrum 
of solutions that should considered, including prevention, human capital development, immigrant 
integration, economic development, income supports and asset development, that can directly 
impact the lives of millions of Americans.
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